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Abstract
A brief review is given of the minority game, an idealized model stimulated by
a market of speculative agents, and its complex many-body behaviour. Particular
consideration is given to analytic results for the model rather than discussions of
its relevance in real-world situations.
PACS: 02.50.-r, 02.50.Le, 05.65.+b, 05.70.Ln, 89.65.Gh
There is currently much interest in the statistical physics community in the
emergence of complex co-operative behaviour as a consequence of frustration
and disorder in systems of simple microscopic constituents and simple rules
of interaction [1]. Appropriate minimalist models, designed to capture the
essence of real world problems without peripheral complications have played
crucial roles in the understanding of such systems. The minority game is a
such a minimalist model, introduced in econophysics to mimic a market of
speculators trying to profit by buying low and selling high. In this paper we
review it from the perspective of statistical physics, with a view to exposing
relevant cooperative and complex features, to demonstrate the significant, but
incomplete, degree of analytic solubility currently achievable, and to illustrate
the possibilities for potentially soluble extensions.
The model describes a system of a large number N of agents each of whom
at each step of a discrete dynamics makes a bid that can be either positive
or negative (buy or sell). The objective of each agent is to make a bid of
opposite sign from that of the sum of all the bids (i.e. a minority choice). No
agent has any direct knowledge of the actions or propensities of the others but
is aware of the cumulative action (total bid) made at each step. Each agent
decides his/her bid through the application of a personal strategy operator to
some common information, available identically to all. In the simplest versions
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of the model, to which we restrict here, the strategy operators are allocated
randomly and independently for each agent before play commences and are
not modified during play. Each agent has a finite set of strategies, one of which
is chosen and used at each step. The choice is determined by ‘points’ allocated
to the strategies and augmented regularly via a comparison between the bid
associated with playing the stategy and the actual total bid, being increased
for minority prediction. This is the only mechanism for co-operation but is
sufficient to yield complex macroscopic behaviour.
In the original version of the model [2] the information on which decisions
were made was the history of the actual play over a finite window (the last m
time steps). However, simulations demonstrated that utilising instead a ran-
dom fictitious ‘history’ (information) at each time-step produces essentially
identical behaviour, suggesting that its relevance is just to provide a mecha-
nism for an effective interaction between agents. A natural non-trivial measure
of the macroscopic behaviour is the volatility, the standard deviation of the
total bid. It demonstrates statistical physics interest in several ways: (i) in
exhibiting non-trivial scaling behaviour as a function of d = D/N , where D is
the information dimension [3], (ii) in exhibiting a cusp at a critical dc follow-
ing a tabula rasa start , and especially (iii) in that the system is ergodic with
volatility independent of starting point allocations for d > dc but non-ergodic
and preparation-dependent for d < dc; see fig 1. This is reminiscent of the
susceptibility of an infinite-range spin glass where a critical temperature Tc
separates a preparation-dependent regime from an equilibrating one.
Since the information on which the agents act is the same for all, this problem
is manifestly mean-field. It therefore offers the potential for exact solution for
its macro-behaviour in the sense of the elimination of the microscopic variables
in favour of self-consistently determined macro-parameters in the limit of large
N [4]. The physics seems robust to variations of detail, but for completeness
we indicate the version discussed explicitly.
Each agent i, i = 1, . . . , N , is taken to have two D = dN -dimensional strate-
gies Ria = (R
1
ia, . . . , R
dN
ia ), a = ±1, with each component Rµia chosen indepen-
dently randomly ±1 at the outset and thereafter fixed. The common random
information enters in that µ(t) is chosen stochastically randomly at each time-
step t from the set µ(t) ∈ {1, . . . , D} and each agent plays one of his/her two
strategies R
µ(t)
iai , ai = ±1. The actual choices of ai used, bi(t), are determined
by the current values of point differences pi(t). Let us restrict initially to deter-
ministic choices, bi(t) = sgn(pi(t)). The pi(t) are updated every M time-steps
according to
pi(t+M) = pi(t)−M−1
t+M−1∑
ℓ=t
ξ
µ(ℓ)
i

N−1/2
∑
j
(ω
µ(ℓ)
j + ξ
µ(ℓ)
j sgn(pj(t)))
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Fig. 1. Volatilities in batch minority games with 2 strategies per agent; (a) with
completely uncorrelated strategies, (b) with each agent’s 2 strategies mutually
anti-correlated but with no correlation between agents. Shown are three different
bias asymmetries between the points allocated initially to each agent’s 2 strategies:
pi(0) = 0.0 (circles), 0.5 (squares) and 1.0 (diamonds). Also exhibited is a compar-
ison betweeen the results of simulation of the deterministic many-agent dynamics
(open symbols) and the numerical evaluation of the analytically-derived stochastic
single-agent ensemble dynamics. From [5].
where ωi = (Ri1 +Ri2)/2, ξi = (Ri1 −Ri2)/2. In the so-called ‘online’ game
M = 1 but here we consider the ’batch’ game where M ≥ O(N) so that the
sum on the actual µ(ℓ) in (1) may be replaced by an average [6] so that [7] [8]
pi(t+ 1) = pi(t)−
∑
j
Jijsgn(pj(t))− hi ≡ pi(t)− ∂H/∂si |si=sgn(pi(t)); (2)
where Jij =
∑D
µ=1 ξ
µ
i ξ
µ
j , hi =
∑D
µ=1 ω
µ
i ξ
µ
i and H =
∑
(ij) JijsiSj + hisi.
To proceed we use the dynamical generating functional method [9] with
Z =
∫ ∏
t
dp(t)W (p(t+ 1) | p(t))P0(p(0)), (3)
where p(t) = (p1(t), . . . , pN(t)),W (p(t+1) | p(t)) denotes the transformation
operatation of eqn. 2 and P0(p(0)) denotes the probability distribution of the
initial score differences from which the dynamics is started. We consider the
typical case by averaging over the specific choices of quenched strategies. The
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averaged generating functional may then be transformed exactly into a form
involving only macroscopic but temporally non-local variables (C˜, G˜ and K˜)
relatable to the correlation and response functions of the original many-agent
problem:
Z =
∫
DC˜(t, t′)DG˜(t, t′)DK˜(t, t′) exp
(
NΦ(C˜, G˜, K˜)
)
, (4)
where Φ is independent of N and the bold-face notation denotes matrices
in time. This expression is extremally dominated in the large N limit and
steepest descents yields an effective stochastic single agent dynamics
p(t+ 1) = p(t)− α∑
t′≤t
(1+G)−1tt′ sgnp(t
′) +
√
αη(t), (5)
where 〈η(t)η(t′)〉 = [(1+G)−1(1+C)(1+GT)−1]tt′ (6)
and the G and C are two-time response and correlation functions be deter-
mined self-consistently as averages over an ensemble of such single agents [10];
see [9] for details. In the limit of large N this analysis is believed to be ex-
act, but it is highly non-trivial. Empirical evidence is shown in fig 1 where
comparison is made between the results of simulations over many instances of
the many-agent eqn. 2 and numerical evaluations of the analytically-derived
single-agent dynamics of eqn. 5, including extension to anti-correlated strate-
gies [6].
Hence, naive characterization in terms of a unique deterministic ‘represen-
tative agent’, in the sense of conventional economics theory, is not possible.
However, a single effective-agent description is available in a much more sub-
tle sense. This is that one can consider the system to behave as though one has
a ‘representative stochastic ensemble’ of non-interacting agents experi-
encing memory-weighting and coloured noise, both determined self-consistently
over the ensemble. Note that eqn. 5 is stochastic even though eqn. 2 is deter-
ministic.
To go further one would need to solve the effective single-agent ensemble dy-
namics in a closed form. A complete soultion is not currently possible. How-
ever, one can solve for certain quantities in the ergodic equilibrating region.
This concerns the aymptotic long-time behaviour, which is stationary so that
the two-time correlation and response functions become functions only of the
relative times (ie. G(t, t′) and C(t, t′) become functions only of (t′ − t)). As-
suming also finite integrated response and weak long term memory leads to
a formulation determining self-consistently the asymptotic order parameters
Q = limτ→∞C(τ) and the integrated response χ =
∑
τ G(τ). Breakdown of
the ergodic regime is signalled by diverging integrated response. Again the
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Fig. 2. Persistent part Q of the correlation function for the batch MG with tabula
rasa initial conditions. Symbols are simulation data. Solid lines are the theoretical
predictions for the ergodic regime, extrapolated as dashed lines into the non-ergodic
phase below dc (where they are no longer valid), the changeover signalling the
predicted breakdown of the ergodic assumption. The different curves are for different
degrees of mutual correlation between agents’ two stategies; from anticorrelated at
the bottom to highly correlated at the top. From[6].
analytic theory works well within this ergodic regime, as is demonstrated in
fig 2. The volatility, however, requires also the non-stationary parts of C and
G and remains incompletely solved in general, even in the ergodic regime [6].
The origin of the large volatilities found for tabula rasa starts in the non-
ergodic regime can be ascribed to oscillatory behaviour, clearly visible empir-
ically for such starts in quantities like the temporal correlation function
C(τ) = lim
t→∞
N−1
∑
i
sgn(pi(t + τ))sgn(pi(t)), (7)
which exhibits persistent oscillations (with period 2 in the rescaled time units
of eqn. 2) for d < dc [6]. Tabula rasa starts in this region exhibit essentially
no frozen agents, whereas highly biased starts result in mostly frozen agents
and hence reduce the oscillations and with them the excess time-averaged
volatility. The oscillations and the excess volatility are also reduced by random
asynchronous point updating [6] and by adding appropriate stochasticity to
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the original MG dynamics [11][12].
Thus, as well as its possible relevance as an idealized economics model, the
Minority Game is of interest as a novel complex many-body system with both
similarities and differences compared with other problems previously studied
in statistical physics. Techniques developed within the spin glass community
have proven useful in its analysis and suggest extensions to other dynami-
cal many-body systems characterised by a combination of local/personal and
global/range-free parameters, such as are typfied by stockmarkets (and in con-
trast to those of most conventional condensed matter systems), without the
need for Markovian or detailed balance dynamics. A complete solution to the
effective single-agent stochastic ensemble remains still a challenge.
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